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Abstract. The turmoil affecting capital markets since summer 2007 and its intensification since mid-
September 2008 inflicted noticeable blows to the world economy. Although the high-risk real estate 
American market is believed to be the immediate source of such turmoil, these last years the euro-zone 
capital markets and financial institutions seem to absorb a continued credit cycle phenomenon and are 
seriously hit by aggravating tensions. It is the first financial crisis the Eurozone witnesses. Today, the priority 
for member states is to quickly find and implement solutions. In this paper, we analyse the recent 
developments in the Eurozone, mainly the Greek and Irish financial crises and the threats the Eurozone risks. 
Finally, we propose some solutions for the crises.  
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1 Introduction 
 
The international financial crisis which hit world economy now two years has been marketed as the 
most serious crisis that ever happened after the 1929 Great Depression [5]. Although the crisis 
initiated with the American subprime market bubble [1], it has progressively spread to the majority of 
international financial markets through derived products, a result of the securitization bank and 
financial institutions credits. Lack of transparency resulting from multiplying intermediaries between 
lenders and borrowers has quickly triggered a trust crisis. Fixing assets at market value brought about 
a collapse in banks rates.  
 
2 The Financial Crisis and Protectionism 
 
The global nature of the crisis is its most distinctive feature in that most countries were affected. 
Subprime credits are purely an American practice (they exist under more or less moderated forms in 
other countries like the UK) and it is the American institutions which are known for loans. This crisis 
has nevertheless quickly expanded due to the interdependence between financial institutions, of the 
securitization which allowed investors the access to foreign real estate markets and to risk price re-
evaluation.  Decrease in risky assets prices in the US influenced European banks which possess such 
assets, reducing thus their demand and speeding European stock markets collapse.   
The crisis hit everywhere mainly Asia and Russia where unemployment figures and social difficulties 
are so dramatic. The current financial and economic crisis is a systematic, spectacular and particularly 
destructive crisis. Employees and businesses of the countries under shock called for protection from 
the state. The extent of the crisis and its socio-economic effects forced these governments to intervene 
although few of them had the intention or the means to do so [3]. 
 E u r o E c o n o m i c a  
Issue 2(28)/2011                                                                                               ISSN: 1582-8859 
 
 
CRISIS AND ANTI-CRISIS 
 
8 
No sooner, protectionism is once again hot news. It took Russia only few weeks to leverage custom 
duties on car importation. India followed with duties on steel importation. Indonesia responded with 
duties on 500 targeted products. In the US, Congress ratified the “Buy American” initiative which 
stipulates that public works financed by Obama’s stimulus plan should exclusively use iron and steel 
produced in the US. In the eyes of the Europeans, this initiative is a violation of free-exchange rules 
and World Trade Organization (WTO) regulations. This return to protectionism may be explained 
partly by a rise in nationalists’ slogans that call for protecting national industries and domestic 
employment and by governments’ wishes to avoid streaming public funds towards financing foreign 
goods importation. These attempts show that protectionism is once again an option and some think it a 
solution among others.  
To these protectionist initiatives, Fréderic Boccara [2] forwards some answers. For him, closing 
frontiers is never a solution, yet jointly establishing social and environmental norms with economic 
partners and imposing a control on investment-oriented public credits with very selective credit 
policies is required. Credits must favour investments with prospects of better salaries, additional 
employment and training at within-norms lower interests. He even mentioned null-approximating 
interest rates.  
 
2. The Eurozone Financial Crisis 
To face this crisis, the European Union (EU) undertook large scale measures setting up a financial 
stability plan totalling 750 billion euros in the form of loans and equities. The eurozone is able to 
support any member state in serious financing difficulties. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 
its turn vowed to support the Europeans with half of that amount. Finally the European Central Bank 
(ECB) lent its support by purchasing public and private debts accumulated by the eurozone. In return, 
the countries in crisis must continuously prove their solvency by credibly reorganizing their finances 
and by initiating reforms conducive to economic growth. Differently put, the current eurozone crisis is 
a public debt crisis. After Greece, Ireland is threatened and shortly other countries like Portugal, Italy, 
Spain and the UK await similar fate.  
The Greek public finances recovery plan is still awaited and a mounting fear of a contagion 
phenomenon within the eurozone is felt day after day. Analysts still doubt the ability of Greece to 
reorganize its accounts and timely meet its financial obligations (debt and interests pay-off) and 
subsequently revive its economy. Then Greece called for help from its European partners and the IMF 
which agreed to lend it 110 billion euros over three years. In return, Greece should install, under the 
tight supervision of its creditors, a drastic budgetary scheme. Nevertheless, this rescue plan did not 
shield other countries from a contagion phenomenon (Portugal, Ireland and Italy). 
 
2.1 The Case of Greece 
The Greek crisis revealed another weakness of the monetary union’s budgetary scheme; lack of 
control of member states’ budget policies. This system facilitated entry of Greece into the eurozone by 
providing false declaration on its public debt and budget deficit. The system could not stop the Greek 
government to fool Brussels again in 2009 by declaring a budget deficit between 6% and 7% on the 
real 13% deficit.  
 
2.3 The Case of Ireland 
Ireland’s deficit is the result of the bad debts of the banks taken in charge by the state. Several raisons 
explain Ireland’s current difficulties. First, Irish banks’ rescue plan is as high as 70 billion euros, 
representing the highest debt/GDP ratio in the world. Moreover, growth prospects record a decrease of 
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(– 1.1%) instead of the predicted increase (2.5%) for 2011. Yet, economic growth is a requirement for 
debt pay-off.  
It is to be noted as well that Irish liabilities have consequences on Europe. Spain, Portugal and Italy 
witnessed an increase in rates as a reaction to pressures on Ireland. In order to recover from this 
increase, some countries like Germany requested Ireland to accept the help of the European Union so 
that to avoid a worsening of the situation. Borrowing costs in Ireland reached a record during these last 
months following worries about a deficit which may reach this year, 32% of the GDP. This situation 
brought fears of a Greek scenario where budgetary problems of a country throw the whole eurozone 
into a crisis.  
Ireland then faces a dilemma: accepting European economic rescue funds now and faces Greece’s fate 
or wait with the hope of voting for the austerity budget in December and calm down market 
speculations. The Irish leaders opted for the first alternative.  
 
3. Is the European Currency a weakness or strength? 
 
Installing the Euro helped member states strengthen their currency across financial markets and avoid 
devaluating it. At the same time, the stability pact which forces governments to remain within deficit 
limits and to respect indebtedness thresholds came in handy. In order to respond primarily to budget 
deficit explosions, the Maastricht Treaty set up a procedure targeting excessive deficits. Accordingly, 
public debt should not exceed a 60% limit and the annual public deficit is set at 3% of GDP. Within 
these limits, each country was able to conserve its economic and budget policies. Some analysts even 
assume that the protection of the euro has favoured lax economic and budget policies for some 
governments at the expense of the whole eurozone.  
The financial and economic crisis does in fact deepen differences among the eurozone economies. 
Each country has its own difficulties. Ireland is paying large amounts on its financial activities. 
Spain’s real estate business is derailing. Greece witnesses social problems. In front of these 
difficulties, the stability pact rules are no longer respected. These internal difficulties are proportional 
to those outside the eurozone. The eurozone is protected from currencies attacks and more and more 
states are joining it: Finland, Sweden, Denmark, members of the European Union, wish to rejoin the 
union rapidly (Buiter and Sibert, 2008). Even the UK is thinking of it despite their attachment to the 
pound. Island, which is seriously hit by the crisis, think of submitting an admission request to the EU 
and the euro. Thus, the eurozone attracts the outsiders, yet paradoxically its members are unwilling to 
introduce solidarity mechanisms which favour them.  
 
4. Threats to the Eurozone 
Daniel Gros, director of the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), highlights the worrying signs 
of the tensions on the interbank market. These tensions translate lack of trust in the idea that the 
system is restored. For him, more and more banks prefer to trust the ECB with their deposits rather 
than lend other banks. He forwards the following explanation: the problems surrounding the crisis, like 
the precarious Greek public finances and the Spanish real estate business, have not been solved 
although they should be with no difficulty. Greece is but 2% of the eurozone economy and its debt is 
just 1.5% of eurozone GDP. Spain is similar. In the worst case, the combined losses of the Spanish 
banks and of other banks intervening in the Spanish real estate business do not exceed 3% of the 
eurozone GDP. Daniel Gros is questioning the paralysis of the eurozone banking system against 
problems which could be easily solved.  
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The Greek experience has shown that neglecting difficulties may generate a circle of risk premium 
increases and a decrease in investors trust. However, there is a more worrying second raison which is 
at the origin of financial market instability; a large number of European banking systems are 
undercapitalized. According to the ECB, the amount of banks liabilities (interbank debts included) is 
20 times higher than their capitals and reserves. In other words, bad debts are 20 times higher than 
capital debts to which some banks may soon face.  
Daniel Gros underlines that in the worst case Greece’s and Spain’s losses will not exceed 450 billion 
euros. However, the funds mobilized by the eurozone are 750 billion euros and proportionally they are 
enough to face the crisis. Nevertheless, this is not the adequate approach to follow. European rescue 
funds could be used to save banks but given that the ratio is 1 to 20 between the capital and the 
liabilities this measure needs astronomical financial packages. Consequently, to cover Spain’s and 
Greece’s losses the 450 billion euros should be 9000 billion Euros, recovering thus the Eurozone’s 
financial sector debt and maintaining its stability. Accordingly, Europe cannot avoid its financial 
markets crisis if it does not remedy its banking sector. 
 
5. The Weaknesses of the European Union’s Economic Organization 
With the massively spreading international crisis across Europe, the weaknesses of the European 
economic organization emerged again. Facing the financial crisis and economic crisis, European 
countries reacted in an individual fashion and without cooperation and sometimes taking opposite 
positions. The ECB and the European governments failed to find the appropriate combination between 
monetary and budget policies as the EU does not have centralized decisions on economic policy able 
to fix and coordinate budget policies across European states.  
This is only possible through balancing the Monetary and Economic Union (MEU) by installing a 
European economic government and reforming competition between states. This would further push 
member states to implement the “2020 EU Strategy”, following the failure of the “Lisbon Strategy”. 
Certainly, the EU succeeded in devising a European Monetary Fund (EMF) which would purchase the 
liabilities of a country in crisis. Nevertheless, there are no synchronized projects but rather two 
propositions which seem to attract European attention (Financial Times Deutschland, 11 mars 2010).   
A project presented by Daniel Gros and Thomas Mayer, the President of Deutsche Bank, targets the 
creation of a monetary fund financed by deficit penalties that countries pay when exceeding 
indebtedness limits specified by the Maastricht Treaty. The paying countries could then benefit from 
an indirect help in case of a crisis. The German minister of Finance is working on a second alternative 
approximating the IMF model. According to this alternative, member states contribute to the funds 
according to their economic power. In case of a crisis, the relevant and EMF member countries could 
benefit from credits if they adopt strict adjustment programs. Some ECB members have expressed 
serious reserves against this alternative because they think it an invitation to threatened states to 
borrow more. This would make EMF projects unproductive.  
Jamet [4] notes that Europe’s task is a difficult one. Unemployment rates are increasing within the 
eurozone since the crisis began. It should reach the 10.7 % in 2010 against 7.5 % in 2007. The 
Eurozone’s public finances considerably decreased due to the stimulus plans, the increase in social 
expenses and the decrease in revenues. According to the European Commission, public debt of 
member states will represent 88.2 % of the Eurozone’s GDP in 2011 against 66 % in 2007. In Ireland, 
public debt will exceed the 25.1 % of 2007 to reach 96.2 % of the GDP in 2011. It should reach 135 % 
of the GDP in Greece by 2011. This state of affairs raises serious questions about the future of the 
stability and growth pact. It highlights as well the opportunity to maintain the same traditional criteria 
on the entry of new states within the eurozone. Adding to this, the social and budget difficulties in a 
context of an expected economic growth relatively weak during the coming years and which 
approximates 1% between 2010 and 2015 against 2.5 % in the US. Another key element is the 
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slackening of active population growth which is explained by the weakness of innovation and 
investment in Europe.  
 
5.1 The similarities between the eurozone and the US crises 
Jean-Claude Trichet [6], president of the ECB insists on the differences between the Eurozone’s 
financial structures and those of the US. The US financial system rests essentially on the market 
contrary to that of the eurozone which is to a large extent centred on banks. On this, he makes it clear 
that at the end of 2007, bank credits in favour of the private sector reached 145 % of the GDP in the 
eurozone against only 63 % n the US. Reversely, the direct issuing of equities represents 81 % of the 
GDP in the eurozone and 168 % in the US. Private credit allocation between the two blocks is then 
totally different. Bank credits, equities issuing not included, in the eurozone covers two thirds of 
external financing against only 30 % in the US. This clearly explains the approaches adopted by the 
two blocks. In the eurozone, in order to insure businesses’ and households’ normal access to credits, 
there must be an adequate liquidity level. Credit allocation must essentially be conducted with the 
contribution of banks. 
 
5.2 How can the Eurozone bypass the crisis? 
In order to define common policies to bypass the crisis, the analysts propose two strategies: 
• Reforming the Eurozone’s governance according to the following foundations; controlling 
private indebtedness, internalizing budget regulations within member states laws and the adoption of 
common positions on international economic disequilibrium. 
• Defining a common structural reform program in view of replacing the Lisbon Strategy. 
In the same context, Jamet [4] gives much importance to the role of France and Germany. According 
to him, France and Germany must set themselves seven objectives: 
- Increase investment contribution in the economy by strengthening investment in public 
expenses in a way to increase financing targeting education and research.  
- Improve employment of active population by improving the efficiency of the training system 
and favouring women and youth employability.  
- Preserving the reliability of health and retirement schemes. 
- Improve environmental regulations and competition of businesses through facilitating their 
access to financing.  
- Reconciling the French and German fiscal system at the level of Value Added Tax (VAT) and 
taxes on businesses.  
- Adopt common investment and energy supply objectives. 
- Define industrial priorities on financing environmental innovation. 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
The financial crisis causes are attributed to markets and essentially to the regulations targeting 
customer protection and financial transparency and to products derived from the securitization of 
credits following the Basle II system. This crisis is revealing of the failure of the governance model 
and the regulating institutions like the IMF and the World Bank which call for reforming regulating 
organizations, abolishing fiscal paradises, re-evaluation of credit rating agency (CRA) and creating a 
new economic order. This crisis led public authorities to intervene in the form of liquidity injections as 
debts or capital and a partial or total nationalisation. This intervention gave birth to a debate on the 
return of protectionism and the role of the State. This return to protectionism, explained in part by 
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rise of popular slogans targeting the protection of national industries and domestic employment and by 
governments’ willingness to avoid using public funds in financing foreign goods importation, is 
judged to be a danger by most experts.   
In this context and following the G20 summit (November 2010), there was a unanimous denunciation 
of all forms of protectionism which according to Angela Merkel would bring catastrophic results for 
all countries. The final communiqué mentioned the firm intention of the states to implement the Basle 
III framework.  
We should insist as well on the fact that public authorities, governments and central banks must act to 
win, preserve and reinforce households’ and businesses’ trust in order to open the path for durable 
wealth. The trust of economic agents depends today on the judgement of central banks determination 
to maintain prices stability.  
It is time now to think of a social transformation project passing by financial markets regulation and 
economic growth to fight unemployment and to improve services. To this effect, two solutions will be 
possible: a unique authority of financial control for the EU or a system of European authorities of 
financial supervision including a central organism which coordinates between local organisms. Each 
of these solutions will improve supervision and help eliminate systematic risks in a European capital 
market which is growing and more and more integrated. This systematic crisis needs a systematic 
response.  
The European Union must take advantage from the Greek crisis in order to repair the structural defects 
of the economic and monetary union issued from the Maastricht Treaty by installing an economic 
European government. Not only does the creation of such institution allow avoiding the debt crisis, but 
also it gives the EU a budget policy instrument which allows it to conduct coherent up-to-date politics. 
Thinking about eliminating some financial instruments like the credit default swaps (CDS) so as to 
limit financial markets speculation should be on the agenda. Finally, creating a European IMF may 
help fight indebtedness crises. 
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